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THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS. Edited by WalterS. Tamopolsky1 and Gerald-A.
Beaudoin.2 Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd. 1982. Pp. liii, 590.
$57.50.
Stephen Allan Scott3

This symposium has as its purpose the exposition of what, at
the time of its appearance, was a freshly enacted series of Canadian constitutional guarantees of fundamental freedoms. On
April 17, 1982, Canada became under its own internal law a sovereign state independent of the United Kingdom. Through the
Canada Act 1982,4 the United Kingdom Parliament (acting on a
request made by both Houses of the Canadian Parliament, with
the concurrence of the executive governments of nine of the ten
provinces) brought the law into accord with the long-standing
political reality. This final Imperial constituent act, with its associated Constitution Act, 1982,s transfers constitution-making
power from the United Kingdom Parliament to Canadian institutions acting through a series of intricate constitutional-amendment formulae. It also effects certain reforms in the distribution
of the legislative authority between the Parliament of Canada and
the provincial legislatures. Finally, it enacts a series of guarantees
of rights and freedoms that appear in part I of the Constitution
Act, entitled the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and
in part III, entitled Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada.
The fifteen contributors to the symposium (which, though now
overtaken by two years of case law, retains much of its usefulness)
deal with these constitutional guarantees.
As the preface notes, the work (like the constitutional reform
itself) appeared simultaneously in English and French. Six of the
contributions (those of Professors Beaudoin, Blache, Chevrette,
Garant, Morel, and Tremblay) were originally written in French.
These, by and large, read very well in the English translations,
I. Now the Hon. Mr. Justice Tamopolsky, of the Court of Appeal of Ontario.
2. Professor of Law, University of Ottawa.
3. Faculty of Law, McGill University.
4. 1982, ch. II (U.K.), proclaimed in force on that date; see Can. Gaz. Extra No. 20
(Apr. 17, 1982) appearing also in 116 Can. Gaz. Pt. II, 2927-28.
5. Canada Act 1982, sched. B.
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and the reviewer has neither read the French version6 nor compared it with the English. But the reader of these chapters should
bear in mind the existence of the French originals, particularly
when a given passage seems puzzling in English.?
Five chapters (chaps. l-4, and chap. 16) discuss aspects of the
Charter as a whole. The others deal with particular guarantees.
I

The general discussion of the Charter begins with Professor
Peter W. Hogg's comparison (chap. 1) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms with the Canadian Bill of Rights. Professor
Hogg develops themes that reappear repeatedly in later analyses
of particular guarantees. Particularly is this true of comparisons
between the Bill and the Charter. For most of the authors the
former casts a long shadow over the latter. Enacted by the Parliament of Canada in 1960 and applicable only to federal law, the
Canadian Bill of Rights set forth a broad series of guarantees and
provided:
Every Jaw of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights,
be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize
the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms
herein recognized and declared . . . .8

The Supreme Court of Canada indeed held in 1969 that the
effect of this provision was to render inoperative federal laws that
could not be reconciled with the guarantees of the Bill. In fact the
Court struck down as offensive to the guarantee of "the right of
the individual to equality before the law and the protection of the
law and the law" (section l(b)), a federal statutory provision making it an offence for an Indian to be intoxicated off a reserve.9 (By
6. CHARTE CANDIENNE DES DROITS ET LIBERTES (G.-A. Beaudoin & W. Tamopolsky eds. 1982).
7. For instance, in the course of Professor Morel's discussion of double jeopardy in
chapter 12, the author speaks of res judicata in criminal matters, and notably the pleas of
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. "Commentators have long asked whether the provisions of the Criminal Code do not restrict availability of the plea to criminal acts." The
phrase "criminal acts" appears in the French version as "actes criminels," which is the
technical equivalent of "indictable offence."
8. Part I of An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 8-9 Eliz. II, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
9. R. v. Drybones, 9 D.L.R.3d 473 (1970), which struck down section 94(b) of the
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1952, ch. 149, at least as to the Northwest Territories, where the facts of
the Drybones case arose, and where-a// law being federal-all liquor Jaws, whether they
be applicable to Indians or to non-Indians, are alike enacted under the authority of the
Parliament of Canada. Thus any differentiation of treatment results directly from federal
legislative action and not (as in the provinces) from a contrast between federal and provin-
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contrast, the territorial liquor ordinance, of general application to
the population of the Northwest Territories, where the case arose,
punished only intoxication "in a public place" and also carried
less severe penalties.) After this initial judicial intervention, however, the Court consistently refused to find conflicts between federal legislation and the Bill's provisions. Majorities repeatedly
found, after examination that usually was at best superficial, that
challenged legislation was properly enacted in pursuance of a
"valid federal objective," in effect applying what in the United
States would be minimum-level scrutiny or less.w
Moreover, section 1 of the Bill opened with the statement
that: "It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there
have existed and shall continue to exist ... the following human
rights and fundamental freedoms . . . ." On several occasions
the Court said that the Bill created "no new rights"; therefore preexisting federal legislation could not be inconsistent with its terms.
Pre-Bill legislation, when challenged, would thus itself become the
very standard against which it was to be tested. In other words,
the response to the challenge would be circular. Of this Professor
Hogg writes:
This theory, which would have robbed the Bill of much of its force, was never
consistently applied, and is contradicted by the decision in R. v. Drybones (1969)
because the discriminatory provision struck out of the Indian Act in that case had
been in the Indian Act long before 1960. Still, the frozen concepts theory kept

ciallaws. This qualification does not appear explicitly in the Drybones judgment, but may
be implicit in later decisions of the Court, where it was said that violations of the equality
guarantee did not arise simply because the federal Parliament dealt with matters under its
jurisdiction differently from the way in which some or all provinces dealt with matters
under their jurisdiction.
Both the ordinance and the Indian Act imposed maximum fines of $50, but only the
latter provided for a minimum fine (of $1 0). Both pieces of legislation also carried liability
to imprisonment, but whereas the maximum under the ordinance was thirty days, the maximum under the Indian Act was three months. In fact, Drybones' conviction under the
Indian Act arose because of his intoxication in the Old Stope Hotel (quaere, a "public
place" within the meaning of the ordinance?) and his sentence was a fine of $10 and costs,
or, in default, three days in custody. On the facts, it seeffiS probable that a conviction could
have been entered under either piece of legislation, and clear that, on conviction, the same
sentence could have been imposed under either, and this, whether the offender was or was
not an Indian.
10. For a notable exception, see the concurring opinion of Beetz, J., in A.G. Canada
v. Canard, 1976 S.C.R. 170, 194, 204-08. A majority of the Coun concurred in the order
proposed by Beetz, J., which disposed of the appeal on essentially jurisdictional grounds,
on the basis that the panicular relief claimed by Canard in reliance on the Canadian Bill of
Rights ~uld not be granted against the relevant panies unless upon fresh proceedings
brought m the Federal Coun of Canada. This made it, strictly speaking, unnecessary to
deal with the Bill; but all the opinions delivered did nevenheless deal with the effect of the
Bill. That of Beetz, J., reviews the earlier decisions, and analyzes the issues involved in a
special Indian status with great care and balance.
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appearing from time to time as a ground of decision in other cases, and has never
been squarely laid to rest.

Professor Hogg's prognostication seems to be one of cautious
optimism:
The Charter scrupulously avoids references to existing or continuing rights
which could form the basis of a frozen concepts theory. That theory therefore
should not bedevil the interpretation of the Charter, although no doubt under the
limitation clause of the Charter the prior state of the law in Canada will be a
relevant factor in considering whether a particular law can be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".

This last-quoted phrase refers to section 1 of the Charter,
which provides: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demon·strably
justified in a free and democratic society." Section 1 in effect responds to the history of the Bill with an attempt to ensure that,
whenever prima facie the rights guaranteed by the Bill are infringed, the legislation or other governmental action affecting
those rights will be closely scrutinized by the courts. The trend of
the case law appears so far to point to the success of the
provision.tt
A number of contributors rely on the differences in formal
status between the Bill and the Charter as a basis for more active
judicial enforcement of the latter. As Professor Herbert Marx12
very reasonably notes, however, "[l]ogically, similar or identical
sections in the Charter and the Bill should receive a similar
interpretation."
The Bill, at least in appearance, was an "ordinary" act of the
Parliament of Canada, while the Constitution Act declares the
Charter to be a formal part of the Constitution of Canada. Furthermore the Bill was (and is generally assumed still to be) repealable by an ordinary federal statute, while the Charter is
amendable only by the "bilateral" and "multilateral" constitutional amendment procedures.tJ Even the late Chief Justice LasII. See, e.g., Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of
Censors, 5 D.L.R.3d 766 (Ont. C.A. 1983) and Re Southam Inc. and the Queen, 146
D.L.R.3d 408, 419-20 (Ont. C.A. 1983).
12. Professor Marx, on leave from the University of Montreal, is a member of the
National Assembly of Quebec; that is, the single House of the Quebec Legislature.
13. Parliament's new power of unilateral constitutional amendment (section 44 of the
Constitution Act, 1982) is framed in much narrower terms than that of section 9l.l of the
amended 1867 Act 31, in force when the Bill was enacted. This could, at least arguably,
affect Parliament's power, since April 17, 1982, to repeal or amend the Bill.
The "unanimous consent" procedure (Constitution Act, 1982, section 41), is not generally required for an amendment to the Charter (but compare§ 14(c) with e.g., §§ 16(1),
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kin, who as a rule insisted that the Bill was a "quasi-constitutional
enactment"I4 demanding more stringent scrutiny of federal law
than a majority of his colleagues were willing to exercise, retreated
on one occasion to the position that "compelling reasons ought to
be advanced to justify the Court in this case to employ a statutory
(as contrasted with a constitutional) jurisdiction to deny operative
effect to a substantive measure duly enacted by a Parliament constitutionally competent to do so."Is In other words, a more modest judicial role was appropriate than if the Bill had been truly
"constitutional."
With these precedents, it is all too easy for courts and judges
to distinguish the Charter from the Bill in the way envisaged (if
not necessarily approved) by several contributors to this volume,
and to conclude that what was not, under the Bill, a denial (say) of
freedom of speech or of equality before the law, has become so
under the Charter. But it would be quite wrong to countenance
such a justification. The Bill was validly enacted by the Parliament of Canada, and Gust as the Charter does now) prevailed
over other inconsistent federal laws whether previously or even
(semble) subsequently enacted. Moreover, it is idle to disparage
the Bill as lacking "constitutional" status. In its legal character
the Bill was no different from a very large part of the Constitution
of Canada. Many rules of the common law, and many statutory
enactments, were at the time when the Bill was enactedi6 fully
17(1), 18(1), 19(1), 20(1)). It would nevertheless clearly be available for this purpose-both
by reason of section 4l(e) and because compliance with section 41 would (at least normally) constitute compliance a fortiori with the other amending procedures. Professor
Hogg argues that the "general" amending procedure (section 38) would be available. As a
rule that seems true, though in some instances section 43 would be available and perhaps
obligatory. See§ 43 and co"V'are § 43(b) with, e.g.,§§ 16(2), 17(2), 18(2), and 19(2). And
in some instances section 41 would be obligatory. See§ 4l(c).
14. The Canadian Bill of Rights is a half-way house between a purely common
law regime and a constitutional one; it may aptly be described as a quasi-constitutional instrument. It does not embody any sanctions for the enforcement of its
terms, but it must be the function of the Courts to provide them in the light of the
judicial view of the impact of that enactment. The Dryhones case has established
what the impact is, and I have no reason to depart from the position there taken.
Hogan v. R., 1975 S.C.R. 574, 597-98 (Laskin, J., dissenting). See also Miller v. The
Queen, 1977 S.C.R. 680, 690 (Laskin, J., concurring); A. G. Canada v. Canard, supra note
10, at 205 (Beetz, J., concurring).
15. Curr v. R., 1972 S.C.R. 889, 899. Here a unanimous Court held, for various reasons, that drivers' compulsory breath test for alcohol was not a denial of "the right of the
individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property and the right
not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law" (section I (a) of the Bill), nor of
protection from self-crimination (section 2(d)), nor of any other guarantee. The reasons of
Justice Laskin, as he then was, were those of a majority of the Court.
16. The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., ch. 3, § 91.1 (U.K.), as added
by the British North America (No.2) Act, 1949, 13 Geo. 6, ch. 81 (U.K.), and repealed by
the Constitution Act, 1982, § 53(1).
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part of the Constitution of Canada, and many still are,t7 and not
the less so because of being subject to amendment or repeal by
simple federal statute. The Bill, in truth, was no less "entrenched"
than these many provisions formally described as "constitutional," but unilaterally amendable by federal act.•s In certain respects the Bill was in fact more entrenched than these portions of
the Constitution, in that it required express words to enact operative laws inconsistent with its guarantees. In the reviewer's opinion, Parliament in enacting the Bill acted well within its thenexisting power to amend unilaterally the Constitution of Canada
in respect of federal parliamentary institutions.t9 It did so by prescribing a particular manner and form requisite for certain legislation: federal statutes offensive to the guarantees of the Bill were
required to declare expressly that they were to operate "notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights."2o It is surely little short of
frivolous to suppose that anything turns on the fact that the Bill
was not styled "constitutional"; and pointless, too, to debate
whether it is appropriately described as "constitutional," "quasiconstitutional," or "nonconstitutional."
The symposium's "general" chapters deal with a number of
other major issues involving the Bill or comparisons with the Bill.
For instance, Professor Hogg argues that the Bill is in effect partially repealed by the Charter; that is to say impliedly repealed by
supersession insofar as the operation of the Charter is identical
with that of the Bill. The reviewer, with respect, is unpersuaded.
First, there is a presumption against implied repeal. Next, the
Charter is an Imperial, and the Bill a federal, enactment: the intention to supersede should be especially clear. Third, on Professor Hogg's argument, it would appear that no single provision of
the Bill is, for all purposes,21 superseded. We are then, surely,
17. Constitution Act, 1982, § 44.
18. Indeed, these portions of the Constitution of Canada were, and are, vulnerable in
principle even to repeal by implication. See McCawley v. The King, 1920 A. C. 691 (P.C.);
Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, 1978 S.C.R. 1198, 1291 (Pigeon, J., for a majority
of the Court, indeed contrasts sections 53 and 54 of the British North America Act, 1867
[now, the Constitution Act, 1867] with the Canadian Bill of Rights).
19. This is true, in the reviewer's view, on a grammatical construction of the then
section 9l.l of the Constitution Act, 1867 (as the act is now known). The results achieved
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament of
Canada to Alter or Replace the Senate, 102 D.L.R.3d I (1979) were achieved despite the
terms of section 91.1.
20. See section 2 of the Bill.
21. For instance, sections I and 2 of the Bill must on Professor Hogg's reasoning
survive for purposes of scrutiny by the Minister of Justice of draft legislation (section 3).
Indeed, Professor Hogg goes so far as to argue that the common law, and pre-Confederation statute law, are not subject to the Charter. The reviewer does not agree with this
proposition; but, assuming it to be true, it affords another important sphere for the contin-
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well short of the conditions sufficient for implied repeal in their
classic summary by Rt. Hon. Dr. Lushington in India (No. 2):
What words will constitute a repeal by implication it is impossible to say from
authority or decided cases. If, on the one hand, the general presumption must be
against such a repeal, on the ground that the intention to repeal, if any had existed, would have been declared in express terms; so on the other, it is not necessary that any express reference be made to the statute which is to be repealed.
The prior statute would I conceive be repealed by implication, if its provisions
were wholly incompatible with a subsequent one, or if the two statutes together
would lead to wholly absurd consequences, or if the entire subject-matter were
taken away by the subsequent statute. Perhaps the most difficult case for consideration is where the subject-matter has been so dealt with in subsequent statutes,
that, according to all ordinary reasoning, the panicular provision in the prior statute would not have been intended to subsist, and yet if it were left subsisting no
palpable absurdity would be occasioned.22

Much eclat (this volume included) has accompanied the introduction of the Canadian Charter: so much so as to leave the
impression that the Canadian Constitution has been virtually revolutionized by the enactment of comprehensive guarantees fully
binding the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the provinces. Such an impression is, unfortunately, very far from the
truth. Section 33 of the Charter, which has become known as the
"override" clause, enables Parliament or a provincial legislature
to exclude at will the operation of sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the
Charter, which contain most of the guarantees of fundamental
freedoms, such as freedom of conscience and expression, the right
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, the right not
to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, and so forth. All that is
required to exclude these guarantees is that Parliament, or the
provincial legislature as the case may be, declare in an act "that
the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter." In
that event, the statute "shall have such operation as it would have
but for the provision of this Charter referred to the declaration."
Such a declaration is subject to a five-year sunset rule and expires
on any earlier date specified, but may thereafter be reenacted,
whereupon the reenactment becomes itself subject to the sunset
rule.
This legislative override is in part the topic of Professor
Marx's useful essay, and references to it recur in the other contriued operation of sections I and 2 of the Bill, which, undoubtedly, do apply to the common
law _and pre-Confederation enactments still in force in Canada and subject to repeal by
Parliament. See sectiOn 5(2) of the Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
22. (1864] 33 L.J. (P.M. & A.) 193, 193-94 (Adm.).
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butions, notably that of Professor Hogg. The reviewer's feeling is
that Canadian legal scholars, not excluding the contributors to
this volume, generally underestimate the significance of the override. Thus Professor Hogg writes of the sunset feature that it "reinforces the already powerful political safeguards against an illconsidered use of the power."
In truth, on May 5, 1982-barely weeks after the coming into
force of the Charter and about the time this volume appearedthe government of Quebec introduced into the legislature a bill
entitled An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982. As
amended, it was passed by the National Assembly, and received
royal assent on June 23, 1982, becoming chapter 21 of the Statutes
of Quebec, 1982. This act in substance reenacted all previous
Quebec statutes with the addition of an override clause:
This Act shall operate notwithstanding the provisions of sections 2 and 7 to 15 of
the Constitution Act 1982 (Schedule B of the Canada Act, chapter II of the 1982
volume of the Acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom).

Although this act has itself been challenged, its validity was
sustained at trial, and it is indeed difficult to see upon what
ground it could be struck down.2J Moreover, since June 23, 1982,
every public general act of the legislature of Quebec, however innocuous, has contained a similar override clause. The result is of
course that most of the Charter is, for all practical purposes, waste
paper at the provincial level in Quebec. Quebec's use of the override proves that the guarantees of the Canadian Charter will be
unavailable precisely when they are most needed. Nowhere in
this volume has this truth been recognized.
Use of the override is thus far more than a mere speculative
possibility. A legislature desiring to override fundamental freedoms may well be fortified, rather than deterred, by the very public opinion that led to Alberta's legislative attempts to control
newspaper discussion of Social Credit doctrine24 or Saskatchewan's statute barring white females from residing in, working in,
or (with limited exceptions) frequenting places of business or
23. Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal v. Dube et le Procureur du Quebec, Superior Court, Montreal, No. 500-05-004093-835, coram Deschenes C.J.;judgment of April27,
1983; reported in an English translation sub nom Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal v.
A.G. Quebec, 5 D.L.R.4th 157 (Que. S.C. 1983). An appeal is pending. On this issue, see
the reviewer's discussion in Entrenclunent by Executive Action: A Partial Solution to "Legislative Override,"4 S.C. L. Rev. 303 (1982), reprinted in THE New CoNSTITUTION AND THE
CHARTER OF RIGHTS 303 (Belobaba & Gertner eds. 1982).
24. See Reference re Alberta Legislation, 1938 S.C.R. 100. The Alberta Accurate
News and Information Act was struck down by the Court as part of a legislative scheme
intruding upon exclusive federal jurisdiction with respect to banking.
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amusement owned, kept, or managed by Chinese.2s
The want of realism in what the symposium says (or more
accurately does not say) about the legislative override-even the
blithe assumption that Quebec laws would be left subject to challenge under the Charter-struck the reviewer as, quite frankly,26
Polyannish.
Yet the Quebec's response to the Charter was an entirely predictable reflex reaction of its Parti Quebecois government. When
the federal executive government and the nine provincial governments (excluding Quebec) reached their 1982 accord on the compromise package that would go forward for enactment by the
Parliament at Westminster, a principal new element was the override power. On that evening, the reviewer, reluctant to comment
on an unseen text, visited the Canadian Press news services offices
in Montreal as details of the accord came through on the telex,
and immediately ventured the prediction that the Parti Quebecois
would insert an override clause into every statute. Why? First, on
principle, to express rejection of the Canadian federation in general and, in particular, of a constitutional reform to which it had
not agreed (though it gave the "eight provinces" including Quebec
most of what they had sought). Second, by making exercise of the
override commonplace, to render the public insensitive to its use
and ensure that no special attention was called to any particular
legislation in which it might be employed.
And why was the override part of the compromise package?
In its majority decision of September 28, 1981, on the Patriation Riference,27 the Supreme Court of Canada held that, legally,
the authority of the United Kingdom Parliament survived intact
and unimpaired; that is, it could validly and effectively legislate
on the Canadian Constitution on its own motion or in response to
any request. But the Court also held that extralegal "conventions" existed, rendering constitutionally improper a federal parliamentary approach to the Imperial Parliament without a
sufficient provincial consensus. Whatever the necessary "consensus" might be, the Court held that the two provinces of Ontario
and New Brunswick, which alone supported the then federal proposals, including full entrenchment of constitutional guarantees,
did not suffice.
Even if it had remained politically possible for federal parlia25. SeeQuong Wing v. The King, 49 S.C.R. 440 (1914), an unsuccessful challenge of
this statute quoad employment.
26. See, e.g., Professor Garant, on the right to representation by counsel.
27. Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, 1981 S.C.R. 753.
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mentary majorities to force the federal measure as it then stood
through both Houses of the Canadian Parliament, it was at best
doubtful that the government of the United Kingdom would (even
perhaps that it could) carry such a bill through the Parliament at
Westminster.
A negotiated settlement became the only solution. The opposition to full entrenchment of constitutional guarantees varied in
tenacity amongst "the eight provinces," that is, those other than
New Brunswick and Ontario. In the case of Manitoba under the
Conservative government of Hon. Sterling Lyon, and Quebec
under the Parti Quebecois government of Hon. Rene Levesque, it
was intransigent.
The result was the November 5, 1981, negotiated "consensus"
of the federal government and nine provinces (all save Quebec),
which contained the override provision. This compromise between legislative sovereignty and entrenchment of basic rights
seemed almost designed to underscore the cliche that in all matters situates Canada halfway between the United Kingdom
(which of course has no constitutionally entrenched guarantees)
and the United States (whose Constitution guarantees a wide
range of fundamental freedoms).
At the same time, the very fact that this semi-entrenchment
was the result of several years of heated national constitutional
debate gave the compromise the stamp of an exercise of the Canadian national will. The country had clearly and deliberately defined, among other things, the constitutional role of the judiciary.
It is surely this fact (coupled with the differences in language discussed above) that will cause the judiciary to take the guarantees
of the Charter more seriously than it has taken those of the Bill, if
still with a good deal of caution. The facts that, unlike the Charter, the Bill was not nominally part of the Constitution and that it
was a federal rather than an Imperial statute, are explanations of
the probable difference in judicial approach only in the sense of
being convenient rationalizations, but not in the sense of being
justifications. Still less are they sound causal conjunctions.
Three problems, not unrelated, as to the Charter's scope of
application recur in these essays. First, are rules of the common
law and pre-Confederation enactments subject to the guarantees
of the Charter? Second, are exercises of the royal prerogative that is to say, common-law powers of the executive - subject to
review? Third, what application does the Charter have to private
action?
On the first point, Professor Hogg, giving as examples the law
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of defamation and that of contempt of court, argues that this
corpus of law is not subject to review under the Charter's guarantees. Yet, Professor Beckton in her treatment of freedom of expression appears to assume the opposite in her discussion of the
same two branches of law.
The issue is difficult and delicate. The former position would
tend to produce haphazard and even unjust results, while the latter position is not easily reconciled with the language of section
32(1):
32. (I) This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within
the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters
within the authority of the legislature of each province.

Yet section 32 need not be construed as exhausting the scope of
the Charter. Indeed, at least in some Canadian jurisdictions the
reception of the common law now rests wholly or partly on statute. Furthermore section 52( 1) is completely general in rendering
"of no force or effect" any law that is inconsistent with the
Constitution.2s
Professor Hogg rightly argues that the references in section
32( 1) to the "government" subject the exercise of the royal prerogative to review under the Charter. Professor Katherine Swinton,
whose essay on the Application o.f the Canadian Charter o.f Rights
and Freedoms is specifically concerned with section 32, proposes a
"governmental function" test that seemingly would cover a good
deal of prerogative action. In the recent case of Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Government o.f Canada, four out of five members of the Federal Court of Appeal considered, and three upheld,
application of the Charter to the exercise of the prerogative in
matters of defense. The Court nevertheless dismissed the plaintiffs' action to restrain the testing of air-launched cruise missiles in
Canada, on the ground that the government of Canada was not
thereby affecting the plaintiffs' right to life and security of the person, merely through such impact as these missiles might have on
international relations.29 As Operation Dismantle shows, simply
because exercises of prerogative powers are in principle reviewable, it does not follow that the courts will automatically find con28. See the opinion of LeDain, J.A., as he then was, in Operation Dismantle Inc. v.
Government of Canada, 49 N.R. 363, 375 (F.C.A. 1983), relying in particular on the
French version of section 52(1 ).
29. Id Messrs. Justices Pratte, Ryan, LeDain, and Marceau considered the issue,
with Messrs. Justices Pratte, Ryan, and LeDain upholding application of the Charter.
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stitutional rights to have been even prima facie infringed. And
even when they have been prima facie infringed, the rules of the
common law conferring the relevant discretion may nevertheless
survive scrutiny under section 1 of the Charter.
The consensus of those participants in this symposium who
consider the matter is that the Charter controls legislation and
other governmental action, but not private conduct. Opinions to
this effect may be found in the essays of Professor Hogg, Professor
Swinton, and Professor Chevrette. The reviewer reads Professor
Dale Gibson as dubitans. In principle, the reviewer shares the
consensus view. The Charter, however, suppresses laws that do or
omit to do certain things, such as laws denying the right to security of the person. So the Charter can indirectly, where appropriate,
accomplish results comparable to those that would obtain it if did
impose obligations on private persons. For example, the Charter
may not create a civil cause of action for assault, but could still be
read as precluding any law that denies such a right of action.
Nevertheless, the state is not of course responsible for all that it
does not prevent. Otherwise, everything done or omitted by anyone would become arguably state action and as such subject to
legal control through the Constitution. The danger -and American experience shows it to be real- is an attempt at indiscriminate extension of the category of state action to embrace private
individuals and corporations with consequent governmental control through the judicial branch.
II

Eleven chapters deal with the Charter's substantive guarantees. Exposition of the guarantees calls for grammatical analysis
of their language, consideration of the history of the relevant
branches of the law in Canada and elsewhere, comparison with
constitutional guarantees and constitutional jurisprudence in Canada and other countries, and identification and weighing of the
competing policy considerations. Inevitably, different authors
strike different balances. Some range far afield indeed: the final
chapter contains references to the constitutions, among others, of
Tuvalu, Kirbati, and Vanuatu.
For the most part, these contributions on the "substantive"
guarantees struck the reviewer as at v.:orst workmanlike an~ at
best imaginative and thought-provoking. The more detailed
Charter provisions seemed easiest to come to grips with; and the
reviewer, after reading the chapters dealing with them, felt "on
top of' their subjects: Professor Pierre Blache on The Mobtlity
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Rights, Professor Franeois Chevrette on Protection Upon Arrest or
Detention and Against Retroactive Penal Law, Professor Ed
Ratushny on The Role of the Accused in the Criminal Process, and
Professor Morel on Certain Guarantees of Criminal Procedure.
There also are useful accounts of rights pertaining to the political
process by Professor Gerald Beaudoin in The Democratic Rights;
dealing with The Language Rights, by Professor Andre Tremblay;
and treating of The Rights and Freedoms of the Aboriginal Peoples
of Canada, by Mr. Justice Kenneth Lyskyk (as he now is).
The general language of some of the basic guarantees
presents a special challenge. Professor Clare Beckton's tour
d'horizon of the position under the laws of Canada, Britain, the
United States, and under the European Convention, alerts one to
the problem areas and possible solutions relating to freedom of
expression. Her treatment of controls upon election expenditures
has proved especially timely, if in the event somewhat cautious.
On July 13, 1984, just as a federal election was getting under way,
Mr. Justice Medhurst in the Alberta Queen's Bench dramatically
struck down federal provisions designed to prevent persons other
than candidates, their agents, and registered political parties from
expending money during electoral periods to promote or oppose
the election of registered political parties or candidates.Jo The legislation reflected Parliament's apprehension about the impact of
single-issue organizations on the electoral process.
A central guarantee is that of section 7 of the Charter, which
secures to everyone "the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice" (my emphasis).
No scheme to entrench fundamental rights can be meaningful
without such a safeguard: the most brutal police state is otherwise
entirely compatible with the constitution. It is not too much to say
that section 7 is the general and comprehensive guarantee, while
all the others in the Charter are particularizations.
By a stroke of irony, it appears to have been the first provision of the Charter to be considered by the Supreme Court of Canada, and the only one to be addressed before his recent death by
the late Chief Justice Laskin. The Supreme Court, in Westendorp
v. The Queen, 31 struck down, as an infringement of exclusive federal legislative authority over criminal law,32 a municipal antiprostitution by-law, enacted under purported provincial
30. National Citizens' Coalition Inc. et al. v. A.G. Canada, No. 8401-01295.
31. 1983 S.C.R. 43.
32. Section 91.27 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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statutory authority. Counsel also relied on section 7 as an alternative ground of appeal, but then abandoned the argument, after
what was rumored to have been a very unfriendly reception by the
late Chief Justice. What appears in the report is this:
It appeared in the course of argument that counsel for the appellant not only
sought to infuse a substantive content into s. 7, beyond any procedural limitation
of its terms, but also to rely on s. 7 to challenge the validity of the by-law provision without accepting as a necessary basis for the s. 7 submission that it could
only apply if the by-law was to be taken as valid under the distribution of powers
as between the legislating authorities. In the result, counsel for the appellant
abandoned the challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Soliciting in the public street for purposes of prostitution is
perhaps not the activity with the strongest claim for protection as
a constitutionally protected liberty. But it is another matter altogether to deny (as Chief Justice Laskin apparently implied) any
substantive protection under section 7 to life or liberty. Aside
from its purpose, the very language of section 7 demands a substantive character by speaking separately of the "right to life, liberty and security of the person" and the right to procedural
fairness. There is, with respect, no "procedural limitation of its
terms." Chief Justice Laskin's response to counsel's reliance on
section 7 as a substantive guarantee was undoubtedly one of his
Lordship's various reflexes of American inspiration. Yet in the
United States the aversion to "substantive due process" seems
simply to have been a historical reaction to a perceived abuse of
that doctrine.
Professor Patrice Garant's interesting essay on Fundamental
Freedoms and Natural Justice--essentially an analysis of section
7-touches only obliquely on the issue of whether this guarantee
is of a substantive character. Although some of his observations
appear to presuppose a substantive character to section 7, the review did not discern a clear conclusion on this central question.
The most intractable challenge for a court is surely deciding
what is required by a guarantee of equality of legal treatment. It
is scarcely surprising that equality issues caused the greatest difficulty for the courts under the Canadian Bill of Rights, and that
the equality guarantee of the Charter (section 15) comes into operation only three years after the general effective date of the Charter (section 32(2)). The very choice of any subject of legislation
virtually ensures disparate treatment of persons with moral claims
to similar treatment. Professor (now Mr. Justice) Walter Tarnopolsky treats sections 15, 27, and 28 of the Charter in The Equality
Rights. The discussion is largely a careful compte rendu of Can~
dian, British, and American experience-very useful as far as tt
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goes, but without the special insights that the author could have
provided had he chosen a more jurisprudential approach. No
one, however, can doubt the author's personal commitment to
equality of treatment in practice. His proposition that "anyone
who would like to use a particular language meaningfully is not
helped by guarantees of free speech: she/he needs others who can
understand her/him and communicate with her/him" is followed
shortly by the statement: "It may be that the government is required to have civil servants who can comprehend the language of
the citizen and reply to him/her in his/her language."
Professor Irwin Cotler, known for his active dedication to the
advancement of human rights in many countries, was perhaps too
ambitious in attempting to deal in a single chapter with freedom
of assembly, association, conscience, and religion. Although these
subjects are related, the first two or the second two topics would
have afforded ample matter for a single contributor. The resulting
seventy-eight pages profoundly disappointed the reviewer, as they
seemed, among other things, diffuse and wanting in clarity and
coherence.
A closing word on general editorial matters. Typographical
errors were not infrequent. More seriously, readers-particularly
in the United States-should be warned that the appendices are
unreliable reprints of the primary legal documents. Appendix I
purports to be the Canada Act 1982, but is actually the text (imperfect even at that) of the motion for the federal parliamentary
joint address requesting enactment of the Canada Act. The text
appended to this volume contains several mistakes and imperfections (for example, reference to the "Constitution Act, 1981 ") and
is any event incomplete (without disclosing the fact). (The Imperial act as assented to, and as published by authority in Londonwhich is the only reliable text-was perhaps not available when
this symposium went to press, but the U.K. Commons bill might
probably have been procured, and printed avowedly as such.)
Lastly, several authors-particularly those from Quebec-quite
properly compare the French and English texts of the Charter in
the course of their analyses. Where enacted texts in both languages are authentic, publishers do a disservice to their readers by
reproducing them in one language only, as occurred here in the
appendices.

